Can we integrate lessons learned from COIN and dismantling gangs?

I am continually struck by how much problems of terrorism and insurgency mirror those of violent urban neighborhoods in the US.

As McChrystal attempts to turn ISAF from a conventional force into an effective counterinsurgency machine in support of the Afghan government and development efforts, I wonder if some these ideas could be implemented in turning around tough neighborhoods wherein local government enjoys no legitimacy and whole generations of uneducated and even malnourished or otherwise developmentally challenged people are produced to begin the cycle of poverty and violence anew. Or if successful community policing lessons can be applied to COIN in some way.

I'm often struck by the basic tenants of COIN and certain similarities in the challenges and social landscape, especially in the lack of credible government and security structures in both environments and the role corruption, lack of political will and resources to effectively combat insurgents and organized, socially embedded gangs. While not discounting the radically different situations in terms of outside actors and complex role of clan and tribal structures absent in US urban environments (although you could argue these are present to some extent in transnational organized crime which often supplies narcotics), are there some practical lessons that can be shared here?