The Iraqi Kurds are officially extracting and exporting oil all on their own.
The oil is flowing north through a pipeline to the Turkish Mediterranean port and hydrocarbon shipment hub Ceyhan.
The big question here is how the profits from the resulting revenues will be shared and invested, as well as what this will do to relations between the KDR and the central Iraqi government. Will this help smooth the way for development and integration or only create more conflict between between the two bodies? I predict that latter.
However, as a fast developing Iraqi Kurdistan continues to benefit Turkey economically, it may have the effect of helping the latter, which has taken on the role of mediator in several major regional issues, to have a greater interest in pushing the KRG and the central government into negotiations and drawing up more practical government structures to facilitate development in the rest of Iraq.
Saturday, May 30, 2009
For the Anthros out there
I recently ran across an article about anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy's new book, Mothers and Others, on Salon.
To my surprise, I hadn't heard of her before, despite her long career of making controversial statements about motherhood, breeding, childrearing, and other related subjects in primates and people.
Here is an excellent summary of her career and key ideas.
Many of her observations and ideas mirror my own after having lived in various countries and observing different lifestyles. I find her statements about allomothers particularly accurate and important.
However statements that her views are now commonly accepted do not ring true to me. After my stint in the London School of Economics Anthropology department and other experiences, I think many of her ideas have yet to gain widespread acceptance, even if they seem obvious.
To my surprise, I hadn't heard of her before, despite her long career of making controversial statements about motherhood, breeding, childrearing, and other related subjects in primates and people.
Here is an excellent summary of her career and key ideas.
Many of her observations and ideas mirror my own after having lived in various countries and observing different lifestyles. I find her statements about allomothers particularly accurate and important.
However statements that her views are now commonly accepted do not ring true to me. After my stint in the London School of Economics Anthropology department and other experiences, I think many of her ideas have yet to gain widespread acceptance, even if they seem obvious.
The 'Love' IED
When most reports from Iraq are full of generalizations about Sunnis fighting Shiites and vice versa, this short article from the NYT offers an example of Shiite members of the Iraqi police fairly arbitrating a difficult and destabilizing problem - lots of young men, who are not only bored and unemployed, but have plenty of bomb-making skills to boot.
Friday, May 29, 2009
Triumph of (old) Technology
Is there a way to make big, unwieldy organizations and alliances more proactive and less reactive?
One reason the international terrorist movement is so hard to contain and destroy is its adaptability, while ISAF, US forces and the Afghan government remain woefully slow to adapt their strategic communications, particularly regarding local populations.
An article in the latest edition of the Jamestown Foundation's weekly Terrorism Monitor takes a look at FM radio stations in Pakistan and their extremely effective use in PR and propaganda for local Taliban militants.
As reported by the WSJ, The US began jamming radio stations in Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier in the year as part of a larger psy-ops program. The Taliban immediately seized upon these efforts to point out how the mighty US military can be undermined with simple technologies, using FM radio stations with only a 20 km broadcast radius.
Particularly in areas of Pakistan where the government has little to no presence, the Taliban use these radio stations to broadcast sermons, urge the young to fight jihad and the old to provide physical, moral and financial support.
Such content is predictable, but these broadcasts go beyond the traditional rallying calls and are also interactive. In Pakistan, where until recently the government rarely had any interest whatsoever in responding to the concerns of the local population, let alone ensuring the provision of public goods such as law enforcement, education and health care, Taliban-linked groups have seized upon popular discontent and can appear to offer an alternative through radio broadcasts. They broadcast from mosques and madrassas where hundreds of male participants ask them questions, which are then answered on air. Women are not allowed at these gatherings, but they are included; they send in questions, via SMS or other means, which are also answered on air.
The Taliban appear to be interested, concerned and pro-active where the national government has never been any of these things.
These groups in some areas have even won over women by enforcing Islamic inheritance rights, which are enshrined in the Koran (chapter 4:11,176). Though daughters receive only half the share of property sons get, this absolute right to inheritance is often better than women would otherwise get according to tribal customs, depending on the particular group.
A more ominous aspect of these broadcasts however is the announcing of names of government officials, NGO workers and others who have often subsequently been murdered. The Taliban can quickly communicate threats and decrees to a whole village via radio.
Another appealing aspect of these channels is that they are in local dialects, providing local news and events. Information from Islamabad, or other major Pakistani cities, is often suspect to locals, who prefer local information sources.
Another reason why jamming efforts are a stop-gap at best is that FM transmitters are low-cost and widely available. A 10-watt transmitter can be purchased for about $200, and most families have FM radios, which cost less than short- or medium-wave radios. Most basic mobile phone models also have FM radios built in, while busses and cafes also tune in. The transmitters are so easy to transport, they can be used on a moving motorbike, and only need an amplifier and car or bike battery to work.
US and coalition forces however are very slow to change from a reactive stance to a proactive one in this aspect of the conflict. Perhaps it is the WSJ journalist's bias, but this portion of the psy-ops campaign focus seems more on jamming these stations rather than a proactive move to counter the content of the broadcasts.
Jamming them alone brings no perceptible positive gain for the US, Coalition forces, or the Pakistani government. Local groups opposed to the Taliban can step in, but if they are outgunned and outmanned by the internationally reinforced and financed Taliban, they stand little chance of filling the vacuum, although recent reports suggest that in some areas local groups are fighting the Taliban themselves with some success now that the Pakistani army is stepping in, according to recent reports.
I doubt the coalition has the means and personnel to set up these radio stations, as they will need people who speak the local dialect and, most importantly, who understand what grievances and concerns are important to the local population.
Even if they did, under similar restrictions to those facing the military campaign, they will be unable to set up rival stations within Pakistan itself.
In this situation the Pakistani government could step in and offer support, equipment, training, and perhaps most importantly, physical protection for anti-Taliban local radio broadcasters. But given the government's historical reluctance to ensure rule of law or any kind of protection, this is unlikely at best.
Protection may even be the only thing that should be provided by outsiders until such time as the threat from the Taliban is small enough that local residents can hold their own against them. Government interference in content may only serve to discredit non-Taliban local broadcasts. Indeed one of the most effective tools of the Pakistan Taliban has been to center its arguments around the notoriously corrupt Pakistani justice system and promise a more just and efficient one under sharia.
There are local stations that do not support the Taliban. According to Mukhtar A. Khan at Terrorism Monitor, some FM channels in NWFP and FATA are successful. In the Khyber agency for example, Radio Khyber's broadcasts of live discussions on politics, education, music and culture have proven popular, so much so that it has nearly replaced the local Taliban affiliate station. Other examples are cited as well.
Khan recommends local stations set up and broadcast content on farming practices, education, health and many other areas. These are key to development, which the government has neglected to foster.
Local ownership will mean more credibility and therefore appeal, and undermine the Taliban, especially those groups using foreign fighters.
It may be unfair to expect massive organizations like the US military or NATO and non-NATO allies to pick up on these subtleties quickly, but there needs to be some mechanism for these ground conditions to make their way to the right people. I’ll have to look into how ISAF conducts hearts and minds operations and where the strategies come from.
It’s not as if there haven’t been some significant efforts to reform the way the conflict is being fought.
General Stan McChrystal, who is now the US commander in Afghanistan and will be the commander of ISAF, has designed a new plan so that the valuable knowledge gained by soldiers serving in a particular locale is not lost:
“The effort, which is being coordinated by the Joint Staff and is still in its early stages, is designed to create an experienced cadre of officers and senior enlisted soldiers, who would rotate between assignments in Afghanistan and at their home stations until the end of hostilities.”
“By doing so, the Pentagon hopes to end a problem that has plagued the effort in Afghanistan—the lack of familiarity with local conditions by U.S. forces who rotate in and then depart after a year, just when they are beginning to understand the area or the mission where they are assigned.” (emphasis mine)
Of course this will require substantial change in how the Army operates, at least with regard to deployments in Afghanistan. The article quoted above also notes some of these pitfalls.
One reason the international terrorist movement is so hard to contain and destroy is its adaptability, while ISAF, US forces and the Afghan government remain woefully slow to adapt their strategic communications, particularly regarding local populations.
An article in the latest edition of the Jamestown Foundation's weekly Terrorism Monitor takes a look at FM radio stations in Pakistan and their extremely effective use in PR and propaganda for local Taliban militants.
As reported by the WSJ, The US began jamming radio stations in Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier in the year as part of a larger psy-ops program. The Taliban immediately seized upon these efforts to point out how the mighty US military can be undermined with simple technologies, using FM radio stations with only a 20 km broadcast radius.
Particularly in areas of Pakistan where the government has little to no presence, the Taliban use these radio stations to broadcast sermons, urge the young to fight jihad and the old to provide physical, moral and financial support.
Such content is predictable, but these broadcasts go beyond the traditional rallying calls and are also interactive. In Pakistan, where until recently the government rarely had any interest whatsoever in responding to the concerns of the local population, let alone ensuring the provision of public goods such as law enforcement, education and health care, Taliban-linked groups have seized upon popular discontent and can appear to offer an alternative through radio broadcasts. They broadcast from mosques and madrassas where hundreds of male participants ask them questions, which are then answered on air. Women are not allowed at these gatherings, but they are included; they send in questions, via SMS or other means, which are also answered on air.
The Taliban appear to be interested, concerned and pro-active where the national government has never been any of these things.
These groups in some areas have even won over women by enforcing Islamic inheritance rights, which are enshrined in the Koran (chapter 4:11,176). Though daughters receive only half the share of property sons get, this absolute right to inheritance is often better than women would otherwise get according to tribal customs, depending on the particular group.
A more ominous aspect of these broadcasts however is the announcing of names of government officials, NGO workers and others who have often subsequently been murdered. The Taliban can quickly communicate threats and decrees to a whole village via radio.
Another appealing aspect of these channels is that they are in local dialects, providing local news and events. Information from Islamabad, or other major Pakistani cities, is often suspect to locals, who prefer local information sources.
Another reason why jamming efforts are a stop-gap at best is that FM transmitters are low-cost and widely available. A 10-watt transmitter can be purchased for about $200, and most families have FM radios, which cost less than short- or medium-wave radios. Most basic mobile phone models also have FM radios built in, while busses and cafes also tune in. The transmitters are so easy to transport, they can be used on a moving motorbike, and only need an amplifier and car or bike battery to work.
US and coalition forces however are very slow to change from a reactive stance to a proactive one in this aspect of the conflict. Perhaps it is the WSJ journalist's bias, but this portion of the psy-ops campaign focus seems more on jamming these stations rather than a proactive move to counter the content of the broadcasts.
Jamming them alone brings no perceptible positive gain for the US, Coalition forces, or the Pakistani government. Local groups opposed to the Taliban can step in, but if they are outgunned and outmanned by the internationally reinforced and financed Taliban, they stand little chance of filling the vacuum, although recent reports suggest that in some areas local groups are fighting the Taliban themselves with some success now that the Pakistani army is stepping in, according to recent reports.
I doubt the coalition has the means and personnel to set up these radio stations, as they will need people who speak the local dialect and, most importantly, who understand what grievances and concerns are important to the local population.
Even if they did, under similar restrictions to those facing the military campaign, they will be unable to set up rival stations within Pakistan itself.
In this situation the Pakistani government could step in and offer support, equipment, training, and perhaps most importantly, physical protection for anti-Taliban local radio broadcasters. But given the government's historical reluctance to ensure rule of law or any kind of protection, this is unlikely at best.
Protection may even be the only thing that should be provided by outsiders until such time as the threat from the Taliban is small enough that local residents can hold their own against them. Government interference in content may only serve to discredit non-Taliban local broadcasts. Indeed one of the most effective tools of the Pakistan Taliban has been to center its arguments around the notoriously corrupt Pakistani justice system and promise a more just and efficient one under sharia.
There are local stations that do not support the Taliban. According to Mukhtar A. Khan at Terrorism Monitor, some FM channels in NWFP and FATA are successful. In the Khyber agency for example, Radio Khyber's broadcasts of live discussions on politics, education, music and culture have proven popular, so much so that it has nearly replaced the local Taliban affiliate station. Other examples are cited as well.
Khan recommends local stations set up and broadcast content on farming practices, education, health and many other areas. These are key to development, which the government has neglected to foster.
Local ownership will mean more credibility and therefore appeal, and undermine the Taliban, especially those groups using foreign fighters.
It may be unfair to expect massive organizations like the US military or NATO and non-NATO allies to pick up on these subtleties quickly, but there needs to be some mechanism for these ground conditions to make their way to the right people. I’ll have to look into how ISAF conducts hearts and minds operations and where the strategies come from.
It’s not as if there haven’t been some significant efforts to reform the way the conflict is being fought.
General Stan McChrystal, who is now the US commander in Afghanistan and will be the commander of ISAF, has designed a new plan so that the valuable knowledge gained by soldiers serving in a particular locale is not lost:
“The effort, which is being coordinated by the Joint Staff and is still in its early stages, is designed to create an experienced cadre of officers and senior enlisted soldiers, who would rotate between assignments in Afghanistan and at their home stations until the end of hostilities.”
“By doing so, the Pentagon hopes to end a problem that has plagued the effort in Afghanistan—the lack of familiarity with local conditions by U.S. forces who rotate in and then depart after a year, just when they are beginning to understand the area or the mission where they are assigned.” (emphasis mine)
Of course this will require substantial change in how the Army operates, at least with regard to deployments in Afghanistan. The article quoted above also notes some of these pitfalls.
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Are Central Asian militants being pushed out of Pakistan and returning home?
Several articles have appeared this week asking if the Islamic Movement of Uzebkistan (IMU) and the offshoot Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) have been uprooted from their longtime hideouts in the Pakistani tribal areas thanks to the Pakistani military campaigns there and are coming home to mount attacks.
You can read those at Euraisanet here and those at Radio Free Europe here.
I have a few quibbles with this.
As some analysts have already pointed out, these groups lack the infrastructure in Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian countries to carry out attacks. They also do not enjoy either popular support or the lax security environment they flourished in in Pakistan.
Some have also posited the theory that the attacks were actually part of a dispute with or between members of organized crime or the security establishment. Such incidents are always possible in this part of the world.
And another thing; why come home and immediately start blowing sh*t up? Especially if they do not currently have a safe have to retreat to and plan attacks from? The IJU has been known to claim attacks it has not actually carried out before.
It would make sense for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to build up their military/police presence in the Ferghana Valley and other sensitive regions if militants are indeed trying to return, which they may be. However I think it would be unlikely that they would immediately start attacking government personnel before they are reestablished. Or does this mean they were already established there and laying low until the time is right? I doubt it, and it seem like the timing would have been more opportune when the Pakistani Taliban seemed to have the upper hand there.
These militants have been fighting alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban for over a decade now, and with the build-up of US forces in Afghanistan and the military campaign threatening their safehaves in Pakistan, it seems their energies would be much better spent on pushing back these enemies rather than opening new fronts and wasting precious man power and resources.
The military campaigns in Pakistan may indeed be pushing Central Asian militants back to their homelands, and this is a serious security concern in a restive area, particularly the densely populated and impoverished Ferghana Valley. However these groups are unlikely to be able to carry out a sustained insurgency for the time being.
UPDATE: The IMU has been increasingly active in Tajikistan in the first quarter of this year, however this long predates the military push into the tribal areas of Pakistan. The government there, corrupt it may be, keeps a tight hold on the domestic security situation.
You can read those at Euraisanet here and those at Radio Free Europe here.
I have a few quibbles with this.
As some analysts have already pointed out, these groups lack the infrastructure in Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian countries to carry out attacks. They also do not enjoy either popular support or the lax security environment they flourished in in Pakistan.
Some have also posited the theory that the attacks were actually part of a dispute with or between members of organized crime or the security establishment. Such incidents are always possible in this part of the world.
And another thing; why come home and immediately start blowing sh*t up? Especially if they do not currently have a safe have to retreat to and plan attacks from? The IJU has been known to claim attacks it has not actually carried out before.
It would make sense for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to build up their military/police presence in the Ferghana Valley and other sensitive regions if militants are indeed trying to return, which they may be. However I think it would be unlikely that they would immediately start attacking government personnel before they are reestablished. Or does this mean they were already established there and laying low until the time is right? I doubt it, and it seem like the timing would have been more opportune when the Pakistani Taliban seemed to have the upper hand there.
These militants have been fighting alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban for over a decade now, and with the build-up of US forces in Afghanistan and the military campaign threatening their safehaves in Pakistan, it seems their energies would be much better spent on pushing back these enemies rather than opening new fronts and wasting precious man power and resources.
The military campaigns in Pakistan may indeed be pushing Central Asian militants back to their homelands, and this is a serious security concern in a restive area, particularly the densely populated and impoverished Ferghana Valley. However these groups are unlikely to be able to carry out a sustained insurgency for the time being.
UPDATE: The IMU has been increasingly active in Tajikistan in the first quarter of this year, however this long predates the military push into the tribal areas of Pakistan. The government there, corrupt it may be, keeps a tight hold on the domestic security situation.
good (and bad) ideas are everywhere
There is always the pull back and forth between practitioners and academics. They criticize each other for being too narrowly or broadly focused and ignoring the other side.
Andrew Exum's excellent blog Abu Muqawama, dedicated mostly to counter-insurgency, as well as many other interesting topics, was recently criticized by a commenter for losing its academic focus.
While I agree with the idea that there should be more up-to-date readings recommended on his subjects, I don't think focussing more on academics alone will help. Academics, just like everyone else, also have a tendency to get their heads stuck up their asses and ignore realities on the ground. I find it particularly frustrating when professors or others insist they have the right perscrption for success in a place they have no first-hand experience or practical knowledge of. I find this particularly true in the field of development, which is receiving more and more attention from those working in security and counterinsurgency as well as counterterrorism.
Theory in development, such as the rather basic idea of collective-action problems, may help practitioners to understand that it is difficult to get groups to act together in their mutual interest, however the extremely different environments and conditions where practioners work never align with theoretical progressions of events.
In short, we need diverse sources of information and to always be on the look out for new ideas in many places, be they academia, the private sector, NGOs, IOs and others. There are myriad factors affecting the success and failure of terrorist, development or military campaigns.
Andrew Exum's excellent blog Abu Muqawama, dedicated mostly to counter-insurgency, as well as many other interesting topics, was recently criticized by a commenter for losing its academic focus.
While I agree with the idea that there should be more up-to-date readings recommended on his subjects, I don't think focussing more on academics alone will help. Academics, just like everyone else, also have a tendency to get their heads stuck up their asses and ignore realities on the ground. I find it particularly frustrating when professors or others insist they have the right perscrption for success in a place they have no first-hand experience or practical knowledge of. I find this particularly true in the field of development, which is receiving more and more attention from those working in security and counterinsurgency as well as counterterrorism.
Theory in development, such as the rather basic idea of collective-action problems, may help practitioners to understand that it is difficult to get groups to act together in their mutual interest, however the extremely different environments and conditions where practioners work never align with theoretical progressions of events.
In short, we need diverse sources of information and to always be on the look out for new ideas in many places, be they academia, the private sector, NGOs, IOs and others. There are myriad factors affecting the success and failure of terrorist, development or military campaigns.
Odd...
A major attack on police and intelligence buildings in Lahore has been claimed by the Pakistani Taliban...and a group calling itself the Taliban Movement in the Punjab (Tehrik-i-Taliban Punjab) which published its claim In Turkish on a Turkish-language jihadist website.
Since when do Punjabis speak Turkish?
Since when do Punjabis speak Turkish?
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
the sitch
Been in Brussels doing an internship covering security and terrorism for about three months now. Apart from finally getting into a career I find fascinating, I'm also learning the ins and outs of politics in the capital of Europe.
Brussels is an odd, though comfortable little city. There is lap dog poo everywhere, mixed in with the Euro elite, working class Belgians and various immigrants struggling to find their place.
As elsewhere in Europe it is becoming ever more apparent that extremist Muslim sympathizers, if not themselves violent, are facilitating jihad elsewhere. This is underlined by the December arrest of the infamous Malika el-Aroud and other members of a terrorist cell in my municipal commune. CNN also recently aired a typically self-congratulatory documentary on her in March this year. Despite visiting a friend in the banlieus of Paris during the 2005 riots, I find the frustration among Muslims living in Brussels more palpable. I am well aware of extemists in mostly South Asian communities in London and elsewhere in Britain, but for some reason I rarely felt their presence, which is not the case in Brussels. Perhaps in part because this city is smaller, and already filled with expats of various stripes, which makes it a much less Belgian, than broadly European, city. Or something.
However my focus is not on domestic stability in Western European cities, though the subject is certainly affecting the movement and financing of jihadists elsewhere.
Brussels is an odd, though comfortable little city. There is lap dog poo everywhere, mixed in with the Euro elite, working class Belgians and various immigrants struggling to find their place.
As elsewhere in Europe it is becoming ever more apparent that extremist Muslim sympathizers, if not themselves violent, are facilitating jihad elsewhere. This is underlined by the December arrest of the infamous Malika el-Aroud and other members of a terrorist cell in my municipal commune. CNN also recently aired a typically self-congratulatory documentary on her in March this year. Despite visiting a friend in the banlieus of Paris during the 2005 riots, I find the frustration among Muslims living in Brussels more palpable. I am well aware of extemists in mostly South Asian communities in London and elsewhere in Britain, but for some reason I rarely felt their presence, which is not the case in Brussels. Perhaps in part because this city is smaller, and already filled with expats of various stripes, which makes it a much less Belgian, than broadly European, city. Or something.
However my focus is not on domestic stability in Western European cities, though the subject is certainly affecting the movement and financing of jihadists elsewhere.
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