One of the things I love most about the Middle East and Mediterranean is that people of all ages and lifestyles stay up and out quite late relative to northern Europe or North America. In Istanbul, I can happily walk outside after midnight any summer night and see families out for walks, old neighbourhood ladies out gossiping, young people out socializing, etc.
It also makes the streets much safer. People talk to each other, watch the neighborhood children and are quick to act if a mugging, theft or robbery is afoot.
The US military in Iraq has grasped this. In this small article touting successes in setting up solar-powered health clinics, it said the solar power systems were so well received, they installed solar-powered lighting in Northwest Baghdad Abu Ghraib. This meant markets, shops and restaurants stayed open longer, increasing economic activity, and as locals felt safer, the stay out later and in greater numbers, thus increasing security and and local confidence.
With one public good, a lighting system with a reliable source of power, you can aid the development and reinforcement of others: community, economic activity and security.
Monday, September 21, 2009
Can we integrate lessons learned from COIN and dismantling gangs?
I am continually struck by how much problems of terrorism and insurgency mirror those of violent urban neighborhoods in the US.
As McChrystal attempts to turn ISAF from a conventional force into an effective counterinsurgency machine in support of the Afghan government and development efforts, I wonder if some these ideas could be implemented in turning around tough neighborhoods wherein local government enjoys no legitimacy and whole generations of uneducated and even malnourished or otherwise developmentally challenged people are produced to begin the cycle of poverty and violence anew. Or if successful community policing lessons can be applied to COIN in some way.
I'm often struck by the basic tenants of COIN and certain similarities in the challenges and social landscape, especially in the lack of credible government and security structures in both environments and the role corruption, lack of political will and resources to effectively combat insurgents and organized, socially embedded gangs. While not discounting the radically different situations in terms of outside actors and complex role of clan and tribal structures absent in US urban environments (although you could argue these are present to some extent in transnational organized crime which often supplies narcotics), are there some practical lessons that can be shared here?
As McChrystal attempts to turn ISAF from a conventional force into an effective counterinsurgency machine in support of the Afghan government and development efforts, I wonder if some these ideas could be implemented in turning around tough neighborhoods wherein local government enjoys no legitimacy and whole generations of uneducated and even malnourished or otherwise developmentally challenged people are produced to begin the cycle of poverty and violence anew. Or if successful community policing lessons can be applied to COIN in some way.
I'm often struck by the basic tenants of COIN and certain similarities in the challenges and social landscape, especially in the lack of credible government and security structures in both environments and the role corruption, lack of political will and resources to effectively combat insurgents and organized, socially embedded gangs. While not discounting the radically different situations in terms of outside actors and complex role of clan and tribal structures absent in US urban environments (although you could argue these are present to some extent in transnational organized crime which often supplies narcotics), are there some practical lessons that can be shared here?
Friday, September 18, 2009
Private militias in Afghanistan
More news in the burgeoning academic field of research private security providers.
NYU's Centre on International Co-operation released a report today called The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan.
The Guardian ran an article yesterday, which I found a bit confusing as far as what constituted a private militia and what a private security company.
Turns out Dyncorp, Triplecanopy and Xe contractors are not the only examples of extremely bad behavior the undermine both local government and the international presence.
There are national and international private security providers. The government in Kabul issues a limited number of licenses and supposedly has laws to deal with private military contractors like Xe, formerly known as Blackwater.
However international forces are hiring private militias on their own, completely outside of Afghan law, which still further undermines rule of law in general, and more specifically the Afghan national government and the presence of the international community. They are also no covered under the Status of Forces agreement.
And if that wasn't enough:
"Many of these private security providers serve as ready-made militias that compete with state authority and are frequently run by former military commanders responsible for human rights abuses or involved in the illegal narcotics and black market economies."
Alliance members, partners and contact countries, particularly in Europe, need to step up and start providing the security that is direly needed to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign. It is practically guaranteed to fail if we continue with the severe lack of resources we have at present.
NYU's Centre on International Co-operation released a report today called The Public Cost of Private Security in Afghanistan.
The Guardian ran an article yesterday, which I found a bit confusing as far as what constituted a private militia and what a private security company.
Turns out Dyncorp, Triplecanopy and Xe contractors are not the only examples of extremely bad behavior the undermine both local government and the international presence.
There are national and international private security providers. The government in Kabul issues a limited number of licenses and supposedly has laws to deal with private military contractors like Xe, formerly known as Blackwater.
However international forces are hiring private militias on their own, completely outside of Afghan law, which still further undermines rule of law in general, and more specifically the Afghan national government and the presence of the international community. They are also no covered under the Status of Forces agreement.
And if that wasn't enough:
"Many of these private security providers serve as ready-made militias that compete with state authority and are frequently run by former military commanders responsible for human rights abuses or involved in the illegal narcotics and black market economies."
Alliance members, partners and contact countries, particularly in Europe, need to step up and start providing the security that is direly needed to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign. It is practically guaranteed to fail if we continue with the severe lack of resources we have at present.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
Counterinsurgency and the Russian military
One reason security forces in the North Caucasus have been totally unable to quash the violence is the rather high rates of corruption, violence and criminality in its own military.
Here is an article on the general state of the Russian military today.
Here is an article on the general state of the Russian military today.
Saturday, September 12, 2009
Afghan protection rackets
The international press has been focusing far too much attention on Taliban drug profits.
While poppy cultivation is of course a serious problem that needs addressing, there are several sources for Taliban financing, and last week Time ran an excellent article on one that has been almost completely overlooked: protection rackets.
This presents an interesting problem. Some would argue that you pay the protection rackets until you reach a level of development in which formal employment and other opportunities are available. But this will not happen anytime soon in Afghanistan, and in many cases development workers are paying exactly those who are destroying infrastructure and killing teachers, students and others.
The only way out of this particular problem is in improving security. A school is of no use whatsoever if you can't protect it.
While poppy cultivation is of course a serious problem that needs addressing, there are several sources for Taliban financing, and last week Time ran an excellent article on one that has been almost completely overlooked: protection rackets.
This presents an interesting problem. Some would argue that you pay the protection rackets until you reach a level of development in which formal employment and other opportunities are available. But this will not happen anytime soon in Afghanistan, and in many cases development workers are paying exactly those who are destroying infrastructure and killing teachers, students and others.
The only way out of this particular problem is in improving security. A school is of no use whatsoever if you can't protect it.
Strategic Recycling
If we are getting so worried about China cornering the markets in certain rare minerals necessary for technology, are we ramping up e-waste recycling programs?
Several articles have come out lately raising pointing out that China is restricting exports of 'green' lanthanide and other strategic commodities.
How much can we extract from unwanted ipods?
One thing I love about life in places like Turkey and Egypt is that poor families have figured out how to make good livings out of recycling and especially e-waste.
So if we have to become more efficient in our consumption in the post-industrial world, and we're worried that the elements necessary for our gadgets and indeed our defense equipment is being threatened, why do we not have massive recycling programs for our e-waste?
Several articles have come out lately raising pointing out that China is restricting exports of 'green' lanthanide and other strategic commodities.
How much can we extract from unwanted ipods?
One thing I love about life in places like Turkey and Egypt is that poor families have figured out how to make good livings out of recycling and especially e-waste.
So if we have to become more efficient in our consumption in the post-industrial world, and we're worried that the elements necessary for our gadgets and indeed our defense equipment is being threatened, why do we not have massive recycling programs for our e-waste?
Friday, September 11, 2009
Like moths to a flame
Is the Northern Distribution Network drawing Taliban north?
That's what this Eurasianet article suggests. I'm not sure that's the case so much as the Taliban are seeking to destabilize the region regardless. Something to look at though.
That's what this Eurasianet article suggests. I'm not sure that's the case so much as the Taliban are seeking to destabilize the region regardless. Something to look at though.
How close is the US getting to Bakiev?
Here's an interesting development"
Yesterday Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov announced that the US plans to provide $21 million for an anti-terrorism center in the country.
The Manas airbase is no longer in danger of being shut down, much to the chagrin of the Russian, who had offered large loans and other incentives to Kyrgyzstan.
Will the center be used to work against terrorism and drug trafficking in the region? Or be largely symbolic?
Yesterday Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov announced that the US plans to provide $21 million for an anti-terrorism center in the country.
The Manas airbase is no longer in danger of being shut down, much to the chagrin of the Russian, who had offered large loans and other incentives to Kyrgyzstan.
Will the center be used to work against terrorism and drug trafficking in the region? Or be largely symbolic?
Shiites turning the other cheek...for now
A key strategy of the ISI is provoking sectarian violence, which is did with spectacular success in the 2006 bombing of a revered Shi'ite shrine in Samarra.
Mosque and shrine bombings aren't working any more, according to this article and the ISI is working overtime to provoke more violence, even destroying a whole village this summer.
“The Iraqi Army is not the one people worried about three years ago,” said Ambassador Hill. “They were considered part of the problem a few years ago; now it’s an army that is broadly understood not to be engaged in sectarian violence.”
Militias got a bad name during that period, even among the people they were supposed to protect. Many were blamed for extorting money from their neighborhoods and carrying out kidnappings for profit. “The time of the militias is over and they will not come back,” said Sheik Abdullah al-Shimary, leader of the Shiite Al Shimer tribe in Diyala. “There are security forces now, and they are the ones who have the responsibility to control our areas.”
...
Another important difference has been the rejection by Sunni politicians of attacks on the Shiites, which was rarely heard in 2006. “The Sunnis openly and clearly are condemning these attacks,” said Ghassan al-Atiyyah, a political analyst who directs the Iraq Foundation for Democracy and Development. “And they’re all emphasizing that this is trying to stir up sectarian violence.”
Now if we can just get to this point in Afghanistan.
UPDATE:
Now new problems are popping up, with violence targeting mush more vulnerable groups with little if any social protection.
Rising tensions between Arabs and Kurds are also diverting attention in recent weeks.
Mosque and shrine bombings aren't working any more, according to this article and the ISI is working overtime to provoke more violence, even destroying a whole village this summer.
“The Iraqi Army is not the one people worried about three years ago,” said Ambassador Hill. “They were considered part of the problem a few years ago; now it’s an army that is broadly understood not to be engaged in sectarian violence.”
Militias got a bad name during that period, even among the people they were supposed to protect. Many were blamed for extorting money from their neighborhoods and carrying out kidnappings for profit. “The time of the militias is over and they will not come back,” said Sheik Abdullah al-Shimary, leader of the Shiite Al Shimer tribe in Diyala. “There are security forces now, and they are the ones who have the responsibility to control our areas.”
...
Another important difference has been the rejection by Sunni politicians of attacks on the Shiites, which was rarely heard in 2006. “The Sunnis openly and clearly are condemning these attacks,” said Ghassan al-Atiyyah, a political analyst who directs the Iraq Foundation for Democracy and Development. “And they’re all emphasizing that this is trying to stir up sectarian violence.”
Now if we can just get to this point in Afghanistan.
UPDATE:
Now new problems are popping up, with violence targeting mush more vulnerable groups with little if any social protection.
Rising tensions between Arabs and Kurds are also diverting attention in recent weeks.
Unknown Soldier
Some amazing graphic novels have come out in recent years.
Most recently, one about Uganda, called Unknown Soldier.
You can read a review here.
My favorite however remains Persepolis, wherein author Marjane Satrapi comes of age in during and after the Islamic Revolution. It has also been made into a lovely film.
Most recently, one about Uganda, called Unknown Soldier.
You can read a review here.
My favorite however remains Persepolis, wherein author Marjane Satrapi comes of age in during and after the Islamic Revolution. It has also been made into a lovely film.
Greening Marines
The US military is taking fuel security very seriously these days.
The US Marine Corps held it's first ever Energy Summit: “Lightening the Load – Reducing the Footprint in the Expeditionary Environment – A National Security Imperative for Success.”
It took place this summer. As so much technology has been adapted from military purposes for civilian use, hopefully this will help to drive development of alternative energy use that can then be deployed among civilian and commercial infrastructure.
The US Marine Corps held it's first ever Energy Summit: “Lightening the Load – Reducing the Footprint in the Expeditionary Environment – A National Security Imperative for Success.”
It took place this summer. As so much technology has been adapted from military purposes for civilian use, hopefully this will help to drive development of alternative energy use that can then be deployed among civilian and commercial infrastructure.
woops
Over the next few days you'll have to forgive me for what may be some slightly old news.
I have several half-written or barely begun posts in here that got stuck when I was finishing up a contract.
Now I've got some more time and can dive back into this massive pool of information and pull out some of the interesting bits for you.
I have several half-written or barely begun posts in here that got stuck when I was finishing up a contract.
Now I've got some more time and can dive back into this massive pool of information and pull out some of the interesting bits for you.
Is it really cheaper?
Has anyone done a study of security costs for oil & gas extraction?
Once again wondering this after reading an interview with Joe Berlinger, director of 'Crude'. He addresses the legal and moral implications, and documents an indigenous lawsuit against Chevron. You can read it here
There is no effective insurgency in Ecuador against oil companies, but it certainly raises the issues common to all such projects, and questions of legal and moral responsibility.
Conventional wisdom has it that these firms are so flush with cash that whatever security measures have to be taken can. But operating costs of increased exponentially over the last few years, as well as maintaining security systems and personnel, and often paying for military personnel to protect and even conduct campaigns around oil installations.
Some costs have fallen thanks to the crash in oil prices and other major commodities. However the need to provide security to facilities and personnel is growing in some key producing countries.
In Nigeria, oil workers can no longer have their families with them, must live in thick-walled, heavily guarded compounds, and can even be kidnapped on route to onshore and offshore facilities. One friend in Brussels was required to commute to Nigeria weekly FROM BRUSSELS due to security concerns.
Supposedly, Chevron, Shell and other majors operating there have preferred to flare off the gas produced as a byproduct of oil extraction because that is cheaper than channeling it to local communities to provide electricity. I would assume doing so would require brand new infrastructure to be built as well, thus adding to the cost.
But I wonder if investing in local energy would have stabilized soft security around onshore and by extension offshore facilities by aiding development. This may have reduced the need and therefore cost of security.
I'm not sure the firms should have been stuck with the responsibility for building the infrastructure, but it also could have ensured corrupt federal and local politicians didn't divert the money.
The conflict in the Niger Delta has been going on for decades and continues to escalate. It may be too late for such measures now, but I would love to see some cost analyses on these issues.
Joseph Stieglitz, maybe this should be your next project!
Once again wondering this after reading an interview with Joe Berlinger, director of 'Crude'. He addresses the legal and moral implications, and documents an indigenous lawsuit against Chevron. You can read it here
There is no effective insurgency in Ecuador against oil companies, but it certainly raises the issues common to all such projects, and questions of legal and moral responsibility.
Conventional wisdom has it that these firms are so flush with cash that whatever security measures have to be taken can. But operating costs of increased exponentially over the last few years, as well as maintaining security systems and personnel, and often paying for military personnel to protect and even conduct campaigns around oil installations.
Some costs have fallen thanks to the crash in oil prices and other major commodities. However the need to provide security to facilities and personnel is growing in some key producing countries.
In Nigeria, oil workers can no longer have their families with them, must live in thick-walled, heavily guarded compounds, and can even be kidnapped on route to onshore and offshore facilities. One friend in Brussels was required to commute to Nigeria weekly FROM BRUSSELS due to security concerns.
Supposedly, Chevron, Shell and other majors operating there have preferred to flare off the gas produced as a byproduct of oil extraction because that is cheaper than channeling it to local communities to provide electricity. I would assume doing so would require brand new infrastructure to be built as well, thus adding to the cost.
But I wonder if investing in local energy would have stabilized soft security around onshore and by extension offshore facilities by aiding development. This may have reduced the need and therefore cost of security.
I'm not sure the firms should have been stuck with the responsibility for building the infrastructure, but it also could have ensured corrupt federal and local politicians didn't divert the money.
The conflict in the Niger Delta has been going on for decades and continues to escalate. It may be too late for such measures now, but I would love to see some cost analyses on these issues.
Joseph Stieglitz, maybe this should be your next project!
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Ghana's Oil: Can it be a blessing and not a curse?
So Ghana will begin reaping oil revenues within a couple of years. This country, though still something very different from a post-industrial economy, has long been considered and oasis of stability and relatively little corruption in Africa.
Its population remains quite poor, though it continues to improve steadily and thus probably more sustainably, while Nigeria sees increasing violence.
On the Foreign Policy website this week, Todd Moss argues in Saving Ghana from Itself to pay oil dividends directly to citizens.
In Nigeria, giving more money to local officials meant it was only rerouted from one set of corrupt officials to another. Rebel and/or criminal groups, which increasingly overlap as the conflict goes on, have had a surprisingly effective impact on the oil industry there, reducing production by 20% consistently, and sometimes up to 40%. Rebels argue for compensation for environmental degradation, health problems and development, as well as the provision of energy to local communities, which would facilitate development. Alas, it remains cheaper to flare the excess gas from the oil fields than to channel it into local communities (which would also need the infrastructure to use it).
The UK, Norway, Chili, Botswana and Alaska (after a major corruption scandal) have managed to escape the 'resource curse'.
Moss suggests Ghana go the Alaska way with paying citizens directly oil dividends. My first reaction to this was, oh no, willy nilly spending as credit card companies and other opportunists move into a market not used to such products. However with the return rather low, about $85 per person according to Moss, this does not look like it would lead to such problems.
It is argued by some that in countries where citizens do not see returns from oil and gas extraction, they either turn to insurgency as in Nigeria, or populist political movements, as in Venezuela. Neither has happened in Azerbaijan yet. Or you could have Angola, where rival groups capture oil installations and damn sure guarantee their security in order to fund themselves.
An insurgency would take some time to develop, and hopefully Ghana's political institutions are robust enough to stave off systemic corruption and the subsequent hollowing out of political and economic institutions. Oman, having oil wealth equal only to a fraction of the flamboyant UAE, has embarked on a far more modest sustainable model of development, without major security threats develop as they have elsewhere on the peninsula.
I don't know enough about Ghana to make a semi-credible prediction here but hopefully it will pull of something similar to the other success stories.
Its population remains quite poor, though it continues to improve steadily and thus probably more sustainably, while Nigeria sees increasing violence.
On the Foreign Policy website this week, Todd Moss argues in Saving Ghana from Itself to pay oil dividends directly to citizens.
In Nigeria, giving more money to local officials meant it was only rerouted from one set of corrupt officials to another. Rebel and/or criminal groups, which increasingly overlap as the conflict goes on, have had a surprisingly effective impact on the oil industry there, reducing production by 20% consistently, and sometimes up to 40%. Rebels argue for compensation for environmental degradation, health problems and development, as well as the provision of energy to local communities, which would facilitate development. Alas, it remains cheaper to flare the excess gas from the oil fields than to channel it into local communities (which would also need the infrastructure to use it).
The UK, Norway, Chili, Botswana and Alaska (after a major corruption scandal) have managed to escape the 'resource curse'.
Moss suggests Ghana go the Alaska way with paying citizens directly oil dividends. My first reaction to this was, oh no, willy nilly spending as credit card companies and other opportunists move into a market not used to such products. However with the return rather low, about $85 per person according to Moss, this does not look like it would lead to such problems.
It is argued by some that in countries where citizens do not see returns from oil and gas extraction, they either turn to insurgency as in Nigeria, or populist political movements, as in Venezuela. Neither has happened in Azerbaijan yet. Or you could have Angola, where rival groups capture oil installations and damn sure guarantee their security in order to fund themselves.
An insurgency would take some time to develop, and hopefully Ghana's political institutions are robust enough to stave off systemic corruption and the subsequent hollowing out of political and economic institutions. Oman, having oil wealth equal only to a fraction of the flamboyant UAE, has embarked on a far more modest sustainable model of development, without major security threats develop as they have elsewhere on the peninsula.
I don't know enough about Ghana to make a semi-credible prediction here but hopefully it will pull of something similar to the other success stories.
Sunday, September 6, 2009
Istanbul not Constantinople
The Foreign Policy website has an excellent post on the state of the moves by the AKP and even, amazingly, the military, to solve the Kurdish Question.
This situation will also directly affect Northern Iraq and vice versa, as well as US policies and actions in the region.
This situation will also directly affect Northern Iraq and vice versa, as well as US policies and actions in the region.
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