What's the lesser evil?

Often we are forced to deal with criminals who also command resources and political power. Often such people are present in the governments of established democracies as well.

But how does one make decisions on whom to deal with, when and how when trying to build a legitimate government in a country? Karzai is receiving scathing criticism for his capitulation to warlords and drug traffickers. And now for paying off Taliban in exchange for security for the upcoming presidential elections on August 20:

"The Afghan President made a reported treaty with insurgents in Badghis province last week. The deal included an alleged payment of £20,000 to Taleban commanders to allow voting in the area. Diplomats reported similar negotiations with Taleban commanders in provinces such as Farah, Nimroz and Herat."

While this may provide better security in the short term so that people from this area may get to the poles, it does not mean they won't suffer other forms of retribution and intimidation. It also provides Taliban with more funds with which to buy weapons and equipment and fund attacks. Kidnappings are increasingly used for this purpose.

It also makes Karzai look weaker. He has essentially recognized that Taliban are the power brokers there. Both his government and the international community have failed to provide security in these areas, and Taliban are actively working to destabilize others.

But what else to do? This excellent article by Elizabeth Rubin from this week's NYTimes Magazine gives some interesting insight into his current situation and perspective. Chatting with my colleagues that know better than I, they seem to think it's a fairly accurate portrayal, though some of info on how he became president is missing.

When a society experiences decades of massive conflict and movement, social systems break down. Old power structures that shape daily life and give paths and purposes to members of that society break down and disappear, as do traditional forms of social protection. Cooperation between groups becomes increasingly problematic, especially when resources are short, as each group is trying to extract the maximum amount from the earth, each other, foreign sponsors, etc, just to survive a bit longer, because thinking in the long-term has basically become pointless. Those in refugee camps don't learn many of the farming and other survival skills their parents or grandparents had, and have also lost many social and entrepreneurial traditions. Secular schooling, when there is any available, remains largely pointless when there are no jobs for educated person to have.

In Afghanistan, one reason the Taliban were successful is that they were united and organized just enough to bring order after years of infighting and chaos after the Soviets left. The various warlords had turned against each other, rocketing each other and Kabul and preventing any stability from taking hold. Many of them also came from extremist, Saudi-funded madrassas that offered young, impressionable boys food, safety, and an extremist, violent interpretation of Islam, as well as little to no contact with women. Many of them were taken their by parents who couldn't feed them.

It is into a country that has survived years of brutality and uncertainty that the international community has come to build a new government that won't provide safe haven to terrorists. The educated have mostly left, and foreigners with little to no knowledge of the country and its various tribes, clans and cultures have come into advise, or paid millions to development and military contractors to do the work for them largely unsupervised. Those Afghans who have stayed on for the duration have had to survive in an extremely uncertain environment and leaders are generally involved in the region's massive organized crime networks.

But they are also the leaders commanding votes and resources, so we have to deal with them.

The US and other countries have had their fair share of robber barons that helped to establish schools, museums and other forms of development. Of course Afghanistan is starting at a much lower level of development. The answer could be gradually drawing the better of them into legitimate, formal economic transactions while making drugs and other illegal activity increasingly costly. But this will require cooperation with all of the countries neighbors.

In the end we will have to deal with warlords. It has been a fact of power brokering since the beginning of human civilization. No society has become democratic over night, and none ever will. Democracy requires a functioning economy, stability and authorities that are not immune to accountability. The availability of lethal weapons to whomever can pay has removed the monopoly of deadly force from governments, and social systems, stability and a functioning economy both require security and bolster it. Which means there is a bit of a chicken-and-egg aspect to this exceedingly complex problem.

Not dealing with these local power brokers at all would be a mistake, but more purposeful and coordinated action is needed from the international community, and it has to step up and commit real resources and action to provide security, and therefore a space for development to occur. It has so far failed on numerous promises, and this has allowed the balance of power to alter as Taliban successfully destabilize areas where they have no public support, but the very real threat they pose to the safety of civilians and lack of protection from Afghan and international forces means locals must base their actions according to what is safest, and often this means never openly opposing the Taliban.

I wonder why they haven't tried to up salaries so that Afghan soldiers and police are better paid than Taliban foot soldiers? After the millions wasted on ineffective aid, why hasn't sufficient fund been channeled to the Afghan Army? It could be a first step.