Triumph of (old) Technology

Is there a way to make big, unwieldy organizations and alliances more proactive and less reactive?

One reason the international terrorist movement is so hard to contain and destroy is its adaptability, while ISAF, US forces and the Afghan government remain woefully slow to adapt their strategic communications, particularly regarding local populations.

An article in the latest edition of the Jamestown Foundation's weekly Terrorism Monitor takes a look at FM radio stations in Pakistan and their extremely effective use in PR and propaganda for local Taliban militants.

As reported by the WSJ, The US began jamming radio stations in Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier in the year as part of a larger psy-ops program. The Taliban immediately seized upon these efforts to point out how the mighty US military can be undermined with simple technologies, using FM radio stations with only a 20 km broadcast radius.

Particularly in areas of Pakistan where the government has little to no presence, the Taliban use these radio stations to broadcast sermons, urge the young to fight jihad and the old to provide physical, moral and financial support.

Such content is predictable, but these broadcasts go beyond the traditional rallying calls and are also interactive. In Pakistan, where until recently the government rarely had any interest whatsoever in responding to the concerns of the local population, let alone ensuring the provision of public goods such as law enforcement, education and health care, Taliban-linked groups have seized upon popular discontent and can appear to offer an alternative through radio broadcasts. They broadcast from mosques and madrassas where hundreds of male participants ask them questions, which are then answered on air. Women are not allowed at these gatherings, but they are included; they send in questions, via SMS or other means, which are also answered on air.

The Taliban appear to be interested, concerned and pro-active where the national government has never been any of these things.

These groups in some areas have even won over women by enforcing Islamic inheritance rights, which are enshrined in the Koran (chapter 4:11,176). Though daughters receive only half the share of property sons get, this absolute right to inheritance is often better than women would otherwise get according to tribal customs, depending on the particular group.

A more ominous aspect of these broadcasts however is the announcing of names of government officials, NGO workers and others who have often subsequently been murdered. The Taliban can quickly communicate threats and decrees to a whole village via radio.

Another appealing aspect of these channels is that they are in local dialects, providing local news and events. Information from Islamabad, or other major Pakistani cities, is often suspect to locals, who prefer local information sources.

Another reason why jamming efforts are a stop-gap at best is that FM transmitters are low-cost and widely available. A 10-watt transmitter can be purchased for about $200, and most families have FM radios, which cost less than short- or medium-wave radios. Most basic mobile phone models also have FM radios built in, while busses and cafes also tune in. The transmitters are so easy to transport, they can be used on a moving motorbike, and only need an amplifier and car or bike battery to work.

US and coalition forces however are very slow to change from a reactive stance to a proactive one in this aspect of the conflict. Perhaps it is the WSJ journalist's bias, but this portion of the psy-ops campaign focus seems more on jamming these stations rather than a proactive move to counter the content of the broadcasts.

Jamming them alone brings no perceptible positive gain for the US, Coalition forces, or the Pakistani government. Local groups opposed to the Taliban can step in, but if they are outgunned and outmanned by the internationally reinforced and financed Taliban, they stand little chance of filling the vacuum, although recent reports suggest that in some areas local groups are fighting the Taliban themselves with some success now that the Pakistani army is stepping in, according to recent reports.

I doubt the coalition has the means and personnel to set up these radio stations, as they will need people who speak the local dialect and, most importantly, who understand what grievances and concerns are important to the local population.

Even if they did, under similar restrictions to those facing the military campaign, they will be unable to set up rival stations within Pakistan itself.

In this situation the Pakistani government could step in and offer support, equipment, training, and perhaps most importantly, physical protection for anti-Taliban local radio broadcasters. But given the government's historical reluctance to ensure rule of law or any kind of protection, this is unlikely at best.

Protection may even be the only thing that should be provided by outsiders until such time as the threat from the Taliban is small enough that local residents can hold their own against them. Government interference in content may only serve to discredit non-Taliban local broadcasts. Indeed one of the most effective tools of the Pakistan Taliban has been to center its arguments around the notoriously corrupt Pakistani justice system and promise a more just and efficient one under sharia.

There are local stations that do not support the Taliban. According to Mukhtar A. Khan at Terrorism Monitor, some FM channels in NWFP and FATA are successful. In the Khyber agency for example, Radio Khyber's broadcasts of live discussions on politics, education, music and culture have proven popular, so much so that it has nearly replaced the local Taliban affiliate station. Other examples are cited as well.

Khan recommends local stations set up and broadcast content on farming practices, education, health and many other areas. These are key to development, which the government has neglected to foster.

Local ownership will mean more credibility and therefore appeal, and undermine the Taliban, especially those groups using foreign fighters.

It may be unfair to expect massive organizations like the US military or NATO and non-NATO allies to pick up on these subtleties quickly, but there needs to be some mechanism for these ground conditions to make their way to the right people. I’ll have to look into how ISAF conducts hearts and minds operations and where the strategies come from.

It’s not as if there haven’t been some significant efforts to reform the way the conflict is being fought.

General Stan McChrystal, who is now the US commander in Afghanistan and will be the commander of ISAF, has designed a new plan so that the valuable knowledge gained by soldiers serving in a particular locale is not lost:

“The effort, which is being coordinated by the Joint Staff and is still in its early stages, is designed to create an experienced cadre of officers and senior enlisted soldiers, who would rotate between assignments in Afghanistan and at their home stations until the end of hostilities.”

“By doing so, the Pentagon hopes to end a problem that has plagued the effort in Afghanistan—the lack of familiarity with local conditions by U.S. forces who rotate in and then depart after a year, just when they are beginning to understand the area or the mission where they are assigned.” (emphasis mine)

Of course this will require substantial change in how the Army operates, at least with regard to deployments in Afghanistan. The article quoted above also notes some of these pitfalls.