The title could also be referring the counterterrorism actions and policies in general, however this year there has been several interesting articles on Al-Qaeda and the fact that it other problems, rather than that network, that are fueling the perhaps stuttering fire.
First, in the Economist, The The growing, and mysterious, irrelevance of al-Qaeda is an excellent explanation of why it has become irrelevant. Though still operating along the Afghan border in Pakistan, perhaps the bigger problems there facing the coalition is a resurgent Taliban allying with other local militants/extremists jockeying for power in the rocky valleys.
Another article in the NYT Magazine, The Saharan Conundrum uses the story of an operative from Mauritania to illustrate the operating model of Al-Qaeda, as well as a terror group in Algeria that has aligned with Al-Qaeda, and the inherent instability of this model.
2 comments:
is this mirroring the rejection of internationalists like al-qaeda by algerian militants and others, where the national issues motivate extremists in those countries?
Well this is an old (and not very good) post. There was a spate of articles about how AQ had become irrelevant early in the year, however subsequent events have shown us otherwise.
In my opinion, most local groups don't really want outsiders telling them what to do. They are glad for financial and logistical help, and certainly glad for experienced, effective fighters, such as veteran jihadists that may or may not be AQ, when they are fighting the fight. However this is not sustained when AQ tries to take too much ownership, or when the objective is achieved. Extremist jihadists were not welcomed anymore once the war ended in Bosnia, though their help was greatly appreciated during the fight. Despite jihadists links to Chechnya since the early 1990s, that conflict has remained locally owned. Even the Afghan Taliban have recently publicly declared ownership of their campaign again and distanced themselves from AQ when AQ is speaking as if they are the same organization.
I don't know what is behind the weaker campaigns of AQ in the Islamic Maghreb of late, though it may have to do with a concentration of resources in Afghanistan and a cash flow problem as donors have been hit by the financial crisis. I'm sure there are other factors at play as well.
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